I'm a bit of a tech nerd, but for various reasons, I've always felt that "electronic voting" was a very bad idea. Mainly, I've always felt that it's too easy to manipulate software (--to help your own candidacy or to hurt your opponent's). To that end, here's some news on our country's premier electronic polling company and their products.
"For years, Diebold has embarrassed itself by claiming that obvious faults were actually not faults at all, and during the past decade or so, it mastered the act of pointing the finger. Now that it has ironically renamed itself Premier Election Solutions, it's finally coming clean. According to spokesman Chris Riggall, a "critical programming error that can cause votes to be dropped while being electronically transferred from memory cards to a central tallying point" has been part of the software for ten years. The flaw is on both optical scan and touchscreen machines, and while Mr. Riggall asserts that the logic error probably didn't ruin any elections (speaking of logic error...), the outfit's president has confessed to being "distressed" about the ordeal. More like "distressed" about the increasingly bleak future of his company."
another link:
"It's no secret that Diebold's electronic voting gear is, um, a little lax in the security department, and now a non-profit group known as the Open Voting Foundation has found "what may be the worst security flaw we have [ever] seen in touch screen voting machines" in the company's older TS model. Apparently these devices -- which produce no paper record of voters' choices -- contain a switch on the internal motherboard (pictured above, with handy onboard instructions) that would allow nefarious hackers to toggle between the two pre-installed boot profiles and "change literally everything regarding how the machine works and counts votes." Even worse, the board also sports a slot for external flash memory from which a third profile could be "field-added in minutes," allowing unsavory characters to overwrite certified files with their own data before switching the machine back to its unaltered state -- with no one the wiser. It looks like Diebold has two options for addressing this nagging problem: either they can open up their machines and source code to a thorough external audit and adopt the resulting suggestions (unlikely), or they can take the simpler route and just get their friends in Washington make it illegal for rabble-rousers like the Open Voting Foundation to play with their toys."
Want to see more Diebold screwups? Try, here, here, here, or here.
I've actually voted on electronic voting machines for local elections, and they work fine enough, but for national elections, I just trust the old fashioned methods better, especially those that leave a physical footprint. I know the old methods aren't practical, especially with huge populations, but still, I've always felt like it was only a matter of time before some hacker tries to manipulate an election.
Although a few of those links are from 2007/2008, to be fair, most of them are from 2006. Also, if memory serves correct, Diebold was talking about selling their voting machine unit in late 2007 because it was not profitable.










